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GRAHAM ON THE GROUND
Cara H. Drinan
Abstract: In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to
sentence a non-homicide juvenile offender to life in prison without parole. While states need
not guarantee release to these juvenile offenders, they cannot foreclose such an outcome at
the sentencing phase. Scholars have identified several long-term ramifications of Graham,
including its likely influence on juvenile sentencing practices and on retributive justice
theory. As yet unexamined, though, are the important and thorny legal questions that Graham
raises for state judges and lawmakers in the very short term. To whom does the Graham
decision apply? What is the appropriate remedy for those inmates? What affirmative
obligations does the Graham decision impose upon the states? This Article endeavors to
answer these and other pressing questions that confront judges and legislators today. Part I
briefly describes the Graham opinion and surveys what scholars to date have identified as
salient aspects of the decision. Part II seeks to provide a blueprint for lower courts and
legislatures implementing the Graham decision. Specifically, it argues that: (1) Graham is
retroactively applicable to all inmates who received a life-without-parole sentence for a
juvenile non-homicide crime; (2) those inmates entitled to relief under Graham require
effective representation at their resentencing hearings; (3) judges presiding over resentencing
hearings should err in favor of rehabilitation over retribution to comport with the spirit of
Graham; and (4) long-term legislative and executive action are necessary in order to make
Graham’s promise a reality. Finally, Part III situates Graham in the context of our nation’s
ongoing criminal justice failings. While the sentence challenged in Graham ought to be
viewed as a symptom of such failings, the Graham decision may offer a window of hope for
reform on that same front.
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INTRODUCTION
In Graham v. Florida,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is
unconstitutional to sentence a non-homicide juvenile offender to life in
prison without parole.2 The Court was careful to note that “[a] State is
not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender
convicted of a nonhomicide crime,” but it must provide the offender
with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”3 Dissenting in Graham,
Justice Thomas objected to the Court’s newly crafted categorical Eighth
Amendment rule on several grounds, including the concern that the
decision was destined to raise a host of vexing collateral legal issues:
The Court holds that “[a] State is not required to guarantee
eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a
nonhomicide crime,” but must provide the offender with “some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.” But what, exactly, does such a
“meaningful” opportunity entail? When must it occur? And what
Eighth Amendment principles will govern review by the parole
boards the Court now demands that States empanel? The Court

1. 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2030.
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provides no answers to these questions, which will no doubt
embroil the courts for years.4
As Justice Thomas predicted, lower courts and legislatures have
struggled with how to implement the decision since Graham was
decided in 2010. To begin, there is the question of who benefits from the
Graham decision.5 Courts are split on the question whether Graham is
retroactively applicable,6 while recent changes in state law have enlarged
the pool of inmates to whom Graham applies.7
At the same time, judges must determine what sentences are
constitutional after Graham for non-homicide juvenile offenders. The
Graham Court held that a judge may not impose a life-without-parole
sentence on a non-homicide juvenile offender, but what about a paroleeligible life sentence? Or a sentence of seventy-five years? Since the
Court announced the Graham decision, close to twenty juvenile inmates
in Florida have been resentenced, and there has been a wide range of
sentences imposed: while one inmate received a resentence of 30 years,
another received a resentence of 170 years.8 Despite Justice Alito’s
contention that “[n]othing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition
of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole,”9 the
logic of the majority’s opinion suggests that there must, in fact, be an
upper limit on what sentences will comport with Graham.10 State court
judges are faced with discerning what that upper limit is, and, as one
Florida judge presiding over a juvenile sentencing said, “It’s a huge
dilemma.”11
4. Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
5. After the Court’s decision in Graham, the Florida Bar Foundation awarded Barry University
Law School a $100,000 grant to “address the legal and policy questions raised by the Graham
decision, as well as individual client needs.” Nancy Kinnally, Foundation Supports Efforts to
Ensure Fair Sentencing for Juveniles, FLA. B. NEWS (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/74f9f
03449b09276852577b2006aed4e!OpenDocument. Identifying the inmates to whom Graham applies
was one of the Barry Law School clinical program’s initial challenging tasks. Id.
6. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Manuel v. State, 48 So. 3d 94, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Graham
applies to a defendant convicted of attempted murder because, under Florida law, homicide requires
the death of human being); see also infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
8. Shemir Wiles, Sentenced a Second Time, Man Given 170 Years: Jessie Cade’s Life Sentence
Voided by Graham v. Florida, CITRUS COUNTY CHRON. (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.chronicleonline.com/content/sentenced-second-time-man-given-170-years; see also Jeff
Kunerth, Dangerous but Different: ‘Lifers’ Sentenced as Teens Get 2nd Chance, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Apr. 3, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Kunerth, ‘Lifers’ Sentenced as Teens Get 2nd Chance].
9. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. Alexandra Zayas, Judges Ponder Tricky Ruling, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 6, 2010, at 3A

06 - WLR March 2012 Drinan Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

54

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/15/2012 12:08 PM

[Vol. 87:51

State lawmakers are also grappling with an appropriate response to
Graham. For example, in Florida, where most of the inmates affected by
the Graham decision are incarcerated, the state legislature had
previously eliminated parole for most felony convicts.12 At the very
least, Graham suggests that parole needs to be available for juvenile
offenders under state law, and states housing Graham inmates13 need to
craft an appropriate parole protocol specific to juvenile offenders.
Florida Representative Michael Weinstein proposed legislation that
would give juvenile defendants affected by the Graham decision the
opportunity for parole after twenty-five years, assuming the inmates met
certain criteria, such as good behavior in prison and obtaining a GED.14
The Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association similarly suggested
giving juvenile convicts the possibility of parole after twenty years, but
then-Governor Charlie Crist rejected both proposals as too lenient.15 A
“Graham Law” is pending before Florida’s legislature, but lawmakers
have not been able to agree on the meaning of terms such as “maturity,
rehabilitation and parole,” all of which are crucial to pending
legislation.16
Even if legislators can agree on a law to guide judges in their
sentencing decisions, the Graham Court’s aspiration demands additional
measures. In particular, the Graham decision placed great emphasis on
the theme of rehabilitation and the promise of possible, if not eventual,
release.17 Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]he juvenile should not be
deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and selfrecognition of human worth and potential.”18 Without even the
possibility of future release, he further explained, juvenile offenders
have no incentive to “become . . . responsible individual[s]” or to engage
in the “considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse,

(quoting Circuit Judge Chet A. Tharpe).
12. Dolan v. State, 618 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“For anyone convicted of a
non-capital felony committed on or after October 1, 1983, the term ‘parole’ no longer exists.”
(citing FLA. STAT. § 921.001(8) (1983)).
13. There is some debate as to the question of which inmates fall within the purview of the
Graham decision. I address this issue below in Part II.C.
14. Zayas, supra note 11.
15. Id.
16. Jeff Kunerth, Dangerous but Different: Bill: Juvenile Lifers Wait 25 Years for Way Out,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Kunerth, Juvenile Lifers Wait 25 Years for
Way Out].
17. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029–30 (2010).
18. Id. at 2032.
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renewal, and rehabilitation.”19 In light of this language, the Court’s
decision imposes certain affirmative obligations on the states. Not only
must the states leave open the possibility of eventual release, but they
must also create the opportunity for reflection and maturity through
appropriate conditions of confinement for juvenile offenders.20 This is a
daunting task, as most states are barely able to ensure the physical safety
of their juvenile inmates,21 let alone facilitate their healthy maturation.
In these ways, Justice Thomas was correct: the Graham decision has
raised a host of collateral legal issues that state judges, legislatures, and
policymakers need to address. These issues—the tasks of implementing
Graham on the ground—are the focus of this Article.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the
Graham opinion and surveys what scholars to date have identified as
salient aspects of the decision. Part II seeks to provide a blueprint for
lower courts and legislatures implementing the Graham decision.
Specifically, it argues that: (1) Graham is retroactively applicable to all
inmates who received a life-without-parole sentence for a non-homicide
juvenile crime; (2) those inmates entitled to relief under Graham require
effective representation at their resentencing hearings so that their full
life pictures can be presented; (3) judges presiding over resentencing
hearings should err on the side of rehabilitation over retribution to
comport with the spirit of Graham; and (4) long-term legislative and
executive action are necessary to make Graham’s promise a reality.
Finally, Part III suggests two broader lenses through which to view
Graham. First, it suggests that Graham should be viewed as a symptom
of our nation’s ongoing criminal justice failings. Second, it argues that,
when read alongside the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown
v. Plata,22 the Graham decision provides some hope for broader criminal
justice reform.
I.

THE GRAHAM DECISION

A.

The Graham Opinion
At the age of sixteen, Terrance J. Graham and three other adolescents

19. Id.
20. See discussion infra Part II.A.
21. See infra notes 191–196 and accompanying text (discussing juvenile vulnerability in adult
prisons).
22. 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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attempted to rob a restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida.23 In the course of
the attempted robbery, Graham’s accomplice struck the restaurant
manager in the head twice with a metal bar.24 Graham was arrested for
attempted robbery, and the prosecutor elected to charge him as an
adult.25 Graham was charged with armed burglary with assault or battery
and attempted armed robbery; he faced a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.26 He pleaded guilty to
both charges under a plea agreement that resulted in three years
probation and required him to serve the first twelve months of his
probation in county jail.27 Because of time Graham had served while
awaiting trial, he was released six months after his sentence.28 Less than
six months later, Graham was allegedly involved in another robbery, and
his probation officer reported to the trial court that Graham had violated
the conditions of his probation.29 Graham was a few weeks shy of
eighteen when the probation violations were reported.30
One year later, a different trial court judge presided over a trial
regarding Graham’s alleged probation violations.31 Graham maintained
that he had not been involved in the robbery, but he did admit to fleeing
from police.32 The trial court found that Graham violated his probation
by committing a home invasion robbery, possessing a firearm, and
associating with persons engaged in criminal activity.33 Under Florida
law, without a downward departure by the judge, Graham was eligible
for a sentence ranging from five years to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.34 The State recommended that Graham receive
thirty years on the armed burglary count and fifteen years on the
attempted armed robbery count, while the Florida Department of
Corrections recommended that Graham receive only a four-year
23. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also John D. Burrow, Punishing Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Case Study of
Michigan’s Prosecutorial Waiver Statute, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 14–21 (2005)
(discussing prosecutorial waiver generally and identifying criticisms of models like the one in
Florida).
26. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2019.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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sentence.35 Instead, the trial court judge sentenced Graham to life
imprisonment for the armed burglary and fifteen years for the attempted
armed robbery.36 Because Florida abolished its parole system in 2003,37
Graham’s life sentence meant that he had no possibility of release unless
he was granted executive clemency.38
The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham’s case
was whether a life-without-parole sentence was permissible for a nonhomicide juvenile offender.39 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
held that the Constitution categorically forbids such a sentence.40 First,
he explained that the Eighth Amendment bars both “barbaric”
punishments and punishments that are disproportionate to the crime
committed.41 Within the latter category, the Court explained that its
cases fell into one of two classifications: (1) cases challenging the length
of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2020. Despite the fact that the state offered no rehabilitative services to Graham during
his probation, the sentencing judge apparently thought that his case was hopeless. See id. (“[I]n a
very short period of time you were back before the Court on a violation of this probation, and then
here you are two years later standing before me, literally the—facing a life sentence as to—up to
life as to count 1 and up to 15 years as to count 2. And I don’t understand why you would be given
such a great opportunity to do something with your life and why you would throw it away. The only
thing that I can rationalize is that you decided that this is how you were going to lead your life and
that there is nothing that we can do for you. And as the state pointed out, that this is an escalating
pattern of criminal conduct on your part and that we can’t help you any further. We can’t do
anything to deter you. This is the way you are going to lead your life, and I don’t know why you are
going to. You’ve made that decision. I have no idea. But, evidently, that is what you decided to do.
So then it becomes a focus, if I can’t do anything to help you, if I can’t do anything to get you back
on the right path, then I have to start focusing on the community and trying to protect the
community from your actions. And, unfortunately, that is where we are today is I don’t see where I
can do anything to help you any further. You’ve evidently decided this is the direction you’re going
to take in life, and it’s unfortunate that you made that choice. I have reviewed the statute. I don’t see
where any further juvenile sanctions would be appropriate. I don’t see where any youthful offender
sanctions would be appropriate. Given your escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent to
the Court that you have decided that this is the way you are going to live your life and that the only
thing I can do now is to try and protect the community from your actions.” (alteration in original)
(quoting trial court)).
37. FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003).
38. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020. “Clemency” is a general term, and it may entail a pardon,
reprieve, or the commutation of a sentence. See Mary-Beth Moylan & Linda E. Carter, Clemency in
California Capital Cases, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 37, 39–40 (2009) (defining the term and its
various forms). Executive clemency grants of any kind are incredibly rare, and as a result, Graham’s
sentence was tantamount to a sentence to die in prison. See Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers:
An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 250–51 (2003)
(discussing a downward trend in clemency grants from 1973 to 1999).
39. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017–18.
40. Id. at 2034.
41. Id. at 2021.
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case and (2) cases where the Court has considered categorical
restrictions on the death penalty.42 Because Graham’s case challenged “a
particular type of sentence” and its application to “an entire class of
offenders who have committed a range of crimes,”43 the Court found the
categorical approach appropriate and relied upon its recent death penalty
case law for guidance.44
When the Court has taken a categorical approach to proportionality,45
it looks to objective indicia of national consensus, beginning with
relevant legislation.46 Justice Kennedy explained that while thirty-seven
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government permit lifewithout-parole sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders, the actual
sentencing practices of these jurisdictions tell another story.47 Based on
the evidence before it, the Court determined that, at the time of the
decision, there were 123 non-homicide juvenile offenders serving a lifewithout-parole sentence nationwide and seventy-seven of them were in
Florida prisons.48 Given the “exceedingly rare” incidence of the
punishment in question, the Court held that there was a national
consensus against life-without-parole sentences for non-homicide
juvenile offenders.49
While the Court acknowledged that “community consensus”50 was
“entitled to great weight,”51 it proceeded to render its own judgment
regarding the constitutionality of Graham’s sentence.52 In this regard, the
Court focused on two aspects of the case: first, the uniqueness of
juvenile offenders—specifically their lessened culpability and their
greater capacity for reformation53—and second, the historical treatment
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2022–23.
44. Id. at 2023; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 49
(2010) (“The Court [wrote] just four sentences to justify its use of the capital proportionality test in
Graham’s case.”).
45. See generally, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (banning death penalty for
child rape); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (banning death penalty for juvenile offenders);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (banning death penalty for mentally retarded offenders).
46. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2024.
49. Id. at 2026.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)).
52. Id. For a criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court’s assessment of evolving standards of decency,
see John F. Stinneford, Evolving Away from Evolving Standards of Decency, 23 FED. SENT’G REP.
87 (2010).
53. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
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of non-homicide crimes as less severe than crimes where a victim is
killed.54 Looking at these two features, the Court reasoned: “It follows
that, when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did
not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”55 At
the same time, when the Court examined the various justifications for
any criminal sanction, it determined that none could justify life without
parole for defendants like Graham.56 Accordingly, the Court held:
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the
State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation . . . . The Eighth Amendment does
not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of
nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain
behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the
judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to
reenter society.57
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in the judgment,58 emphasized that
the Court did not need to craft a categorical rule for all cases like
Graham’s.59 Instead, under the Chief Justice’s approach, the Court could
have relied upon its well-established “narrow proportionality” review
historically applicable to non-capital cases.60 According to the Chief
Justice, applying that precedent would have “provide[d] a sufficient
framework for assessing the concerns outlined by the majority”61 and
54. Id. at 2027.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2028–30.
57. Id. at 2030.
58. Id. at 2036–43 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Stevens also wrote a concurring opinion, in
which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Society
changes. Knowledge accumulates. We learn, sometimes, from our mistakes.”).
59. Id. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Barkow, supra note 44, at 51–52 (discussing
the potential import of the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion for future proportionality review at the
U.S. Supreme Court and among lower courts).
60. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039–41 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Historically, narrow
proportionality review has required the reviewing courts to conduct an initial inquiry that compares
the gravity of the offense with the harshness of the penalty. This initial inquiry is a deferential one.
Only in rare cases where the reviewing court finds a sentence to be grossly disproportionate to the
crime committed should the court then conduct both an intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional
comparison with sentences imposed for the same crime. If these two comparisons confirm the
court’s initial finding of gross disproportionality, only then should the reviewing court find the
defendant’s sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2037–38 (explaining the narrow
proportionality review process).
61. Id. at 2039.
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avoided inventing “a new constitutional rule of dubious provenance.”62
Justices Thomas and Alito each dissented. Justice Thomas’ dissent
emphasized what he saw as the majority’s methodological flaws. First,
he criticized the Court’s “eviscerat[ion]” of the “death is different”
approach to Eighth Amendment proportionality review.63 This new
approach, in Justice Thomas’ view, opened the door to unlimited judicial
authority in the Eighth Amendment realm. According to Justice Thomas,
if the Court has the authority to categorically exempt a certain class of
offenders from the “second most severe penalty,”64 there is nothing to
prevent the Court from also exempting additional classes of offenders
“from the law’s third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe penalties as
well.”65
Second, Justice Thomas viewed the majority’s decision as raising
serious separation of powers concerns: “The ultimate question in this
case is not whether a life-without-parole sentence ‘fits’ the crime at issue
here or the crimes of juvenile nonhomicide offenders more generally,
but to whom the Constitution assigns that decision.”66 According to
Justice Thomas, the Constitution assigned that decision to the voters and
their elected officials.67 Because the Florida legislature authorized a
sentence of life without parole for non-homicide offenses and because
the trial judge in Graham’s case lawfully imposed that sentence, Justice
Thomas saw no role for the U.S. Supreme Court to play in this case.68
By tackling this question, Justice Thomas wrote that the Court “reached
to ensure that its own sense of morality and retributive justice pre-empts
that of the people and their representatives.”69
Justice Alito joined in Justice Thomas’ dissent, but also raised a
separate point that deserves attention. He stated, “Nothing in the Court’s
opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without
the possibility of parole. Indeed, petitioner conceded at oral argument
that a sentence of as much as 40 years without the possibility of parole
‘probably’ would be constitutional.”70
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court found life-without-parole sentences
62. Id. at 2036.
63. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting majority opinion).
65. Id. (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 2058.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
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unconstitutional for juvenile non-homicide offenders and, with its
decision, entitled Terrance Graham and those similarly situated to a new
sentence.
B.

Early Graham Scholarship

Scholars have already identified several long-term, downstream
implications that may flow from the Court’s decision in Graham. For
example, some scholars have seized upon Graham’s methodological
import.71 As discussed earlier, the Graham Court departed from the
Court’s traditional use of narrow proportionality review in its non-death
penalty cases.72 Scholars have argued that this methodological shift may
have significant impact upon the Court’s jurisprudence both within and
outside of the capital context.
Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker have noted that, by shifting the
Court’s methodology away from capital-versus-noncapital challenges to
individual-versus-categorical challenges, “the window that Graham
appears to open relates to classes of noncapital offenders who can assert
special grounds for avoiding especially harsh punishment.”73 Under the
Court’s new approach, the authors suggest that Graham permits juvenile
challenges to life imprisonment and to excessive term-of-years
sentences.74 At the same time, Professors Steiker and Steiker describe
critical ways in which Graham may shape future capital cases, including
the way its methodology “bolster[s]” the “constitutional case against the
death penalty” altogether.75

71. See generally, e.g., Barkow, supra note 44 (considering implications of the Graham decision
in future Eighth Amendment challenges); Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song:
Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 86 (2010) (describing Graham Court’s departure from prior Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and implications); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine
in: The Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-off Approaches to Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010) (discussing implications of
Graham decision for capital and noncapital Eighth Amendment challenges).
72. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
73. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 71, at 81 (emphasis in original).
74. Id. To date, though, many courts continue to read Graham narrowly. See, e.g., Saeliaw v.
Allison, No. C 11–2716 RS (PR), 2011 WL 3516171, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011) (rejecting
juvenile non-homicide offender’s challenge to indeterminate life sentence after Graham); Angel v.
Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 401–02 (Va. 2011) (upholding life sentence for non-homicide
juvenile crime because state statute provided for conditional release upon a certain age); State v.
Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451, 465–74 (Wis. 2011) (upholding life without parole for fourteen-year-old
homicide offender after Graham).
75. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 71, at 84 (“[I]f death sentencing rates and execution rates
continue to fall, or even remain stable at the current low levels, one can make a plausible claim that
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Others have suggested that the Graham Court’s “constitutional
mathematics” of borrowing from two separate lines of analysis—ageand homicide-based limitations on the death penalty—has potentially
broad implications for future cases.76 For example, in the same way that
the Graham Court described juvenile non-homicide offenders as having
“twice diminished moral culpability,”77 “it would appear that a claim
exists that a sentence of [life without parole] would also be
unconstitutional for a mentally retarded defendant who did not kill or
participate in a homicide.”78 Professor William Berry has argued that life
without parole is different from all other forms of punishment and that,
after Graham, the Court should consider establishing a separate category
of Eighth Amendment review.79 Only two years after the Graham
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
fourteen-year-old children who were convicted of homicide may be
sentenced to life in prison without parole after Graham.80 Thus, scholars
have correctly noted the vast implications of the Court’s methodology in
Graham.
Legal scholars have also identified the “youth is different”81 aspect of
the Graham Court’s decision. The Graham Court borrowed heavily
from its decision in Roper v. Simmons,82 which banned the death penalty
for juveniles, and emphasized the psychological immaturity of juveniles
and their unique capacity for rehabilitation.83 Scholars have argued that
the Graham Court’s emphasis upon juvenile psychology and
neurological development may lay the foundation for future limitations
on juvenile sentencing practices. For example, one scholar posits that
the legislative authorization of capital punishment is undercut by its small and very sporadic use, in
much the same way that Graham found that the widespread legislative authorization of [life without
parole] for juvenile nonhomicide offenders . . . was undercut by its relatively small actual use
relative to its formally authorized use.”).
76. Smith & Cohen, supra note 71, at 91.
77. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
78. Smith & Cohen, supra note 71, at 91. But see United States v. Moore, 643 F.3d 451, 456–57
(6th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing the Eighth Amendment challenge of a mentally retarded adult from
that presented by Graham).
79. See generally William W. Berry III, More Different from Life, Less Different than Death, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010).
80. Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, __S.W.3d__ (2011), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v.
Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2011) (No. 10-09647); see also Adam Liptak, Justices Will
Hear 2 Cases of Life Sentences for Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A13.
81. See generally Stephen St. Vincent, Commentary: Kids Are Different, 109 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9 (2010).
82. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
83. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–30 (2010).
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increased knowledge about juvenile psychology will suggest more
appropriate punishments and treatments for juveniles.84 Such knowledge
“may lead to our societal standards of decency evolving more quickly
towards less harsh sentences for juveniles than for adults, especially if
there is no corresponding evidence that adult offenders would benefit
from the same types of punishment as juveniles.”85 Another scholar has
argued that Graham’s reasoning—seen in the context of the Court’s
precedents—suggests that juveniles are not eligible for any kind of
retributive punishment.86 Other scholars have argued that the Graham
decision is only one example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent childspecific jurisprudence.87 With these recent arguments, scholars have
begun to articulate how the Graham Court’s emphasis upon the unique
aspects of juveniles may shape future cases.
Finally, many scholars have used Graham as an opportunity to reexamine the validity of life-without-parole sentencing nationwide. One
scholar has argued that life-without-parole sentencing abandons
altogether the notion of personal reformation—a notion that has
historically driven American sentencing policy—and that moving away
from the sentencing practice makes sense for individual inmates and
taxpayers alike.88 Another scholar has made the case that executive
actors should revive their use of clemency as an antidote to the lifewithout-parole sentencing trend.89 As this scholarship indicates,
Graham’s long-term implications may be both significant and farreaching.
84. St. Vincent, supra note 81, at 13.
85. Id.
86. Dan Markel, May Minors Be Retributively Punished After Panetti (and Graham)?, 23 FED.
SENT’G REP. 62, 65 (2010) (arguing that in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, “juveniles
must be treated somewhat like the incompetent: that is, as sources of risk and objects of compassion
who can hopefully be cured or treated or contained until they exhibit the competence expected from
them as adults. Until that time . . . they should be spared the special sting of condemnation
associated with the retributive rebuke commonly connected to punishments in prisons or trials as
adults”).
87. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy’s Vision of Childhood and
the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 66 (2010) (noting Justice Kennedy’s
consistent theme of youths as works in progress in areas such as the Establishment Clause, criminal
sentencing, and due process); Deana Pollard Sacks, Children’s Developmental Vulnerability & the
Roberts Court’s Child-Protective Jurisprudence: An Emerging Trend?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 777
(2011) (noting the Court’s recent concern for the vulnerability of children in media and criminal
sentencing cases).
88. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences in
the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27 (2010).
89. Molly M. Gill, Clemency for Lifers: The Only Road Out Is the Road Not Taken, 23 FED.
SENT’G REP. 21 (2010).
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What has yet to be—and needs to be—examined are the vexing legal
issues before judges and legislators today. The next Part of this Article
addresses those issues.
II.

IMPLEMENTING GRAHAM ON THE GROUND

This Part addresses several urgent collateral issues that flow from the
Graham decision—all of which judges and lawmakers are addressing
today. Specifically, it argues that: (1) Graham is retroactively applicable
to all inmates who received a life-without-parole sentence for a nonhomicide juvenile crime; (2) those inmates entitled to relief under
Graham require effective representation at their resentencing hearings;
(3) judges presiding over resentencing hearings in the wake of Graham
should err on the side of rehabilitation over retribution to comport with
the spirit of Graham; and (4) long-term legislative and executive action
are necessary in order to make Graham’s promise a reality.
A.

Graham Applies Retroactively

In the last year, lower courts have disagreed over whether Graham
applies retroactively.90 Perhaps this disagreement should not be
surprising, as scholars historically have criticized the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opaque retroactivity doctrine.91 Nonetheless, the Court’s most
90. Compare Bell v. Haws, No. CV09-3346-JFW (MLG), 2010 WL 3447218, at *9 n.6 (C.D.
Cal. July 14, 2010) (“The Court notes that application of Graham to Petitioner’s case is permitted
by the first exception to the Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989),
non-retroactivity doctrine because it announced a new rule that ‘prohibit[s] a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’ . . . Here, the Graham Court
announced a new rule that prohibits a category of punishment—life without parole sentences—for
juveniles based on their status and the type of offense, and the rule is thus retroactive on collateral
review.” (citations omitted)), and Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Iowa 2010) (“Graham
applies retroactively to Bonilla because it is a new rule of substantive law clarifying the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”), with Lawson v. Pennsylvania, No.
Civ.A. 09-2120, 2010 WL 5300531, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010) (“[T]here is no indication that
the Supreme Court has held Graham retroactively applicable on collateral review . . . .”), and Jensen
v. Zavaras, Civil Action No. 08-cv-01670-RPM, 2010 WL 2825666, at *1–2 (D. Colo. July 16,
2010) (“Given the Court’s recognition of the many state statutes that permit life without parole for
juvenile non-homicide offenders shown in the appendix to the opinion and the premise that
Graham’s sentence was contrary to the majority’s view of ‘evolving standards of decency’ it is
inconceivable that this new rule will be applied retroactively to invalidate sentences imposed in
those states.”).
91. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 100 n.310
(2004) (“[T]he present jurisprudence of retroactivity is widely thought to be unnecessarily confused
and confusing.” (citations omitted)); Christopher Strauss, Collateral Damage: How the Supreme
Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’ Apprendi Claims on Collateral
Review, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (2003) (“Over the course of the past thirty-six years, the Court
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recent relevant case law makes clear that a new substantive rule, like the
one announced in Graham, does apply retroactively.92 Accordingly, a
juvenile non-homicide offender serving a life-without-parole sentence is
entitled to challenge that sentence under Graham, regardless of the
procedural posture of the offender’s case.93 This sub-part explains
retroactivity in general and its application to the Graham decision.
The question of who benefits from a new constitutional rule hinges on
both the nature of the rule and the posture of the individual’s case. When
the U.S. Supreme Court announces a new constitutional rule, that rule is
applicable to all criminal cases still pending on direct review.94 This is
because the Court, unlike a legislative body, decides only one case at a
time, and each case must serve as “the vehicle for announcement of a
new rule.”95 The Court has long recognized that similarly situated
individuals whose cases are pending on direct review fall within the
purview of a new rule.96
Whether a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies
retroactively to cases pending on collateral review is more complex. In
Teague v. Lane,97 the Court embraced a position previously advocated
by Justice Harlan and held that, in general, new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure are not applicable to cases on collateral review.98
Under this so-called “non-retroactivity doctrine,” a defendant whose
case is at the habeas corpus stage may only invoke a new rule in one of
two situations.99 First, the defendant may raise a claim based on the new
rule if the rule itself “places a class of private conduct beyond the power
has grappled with the issue of retroactivity and has crafted a theoretically incoherent doctrine that
has proven difficult to apply.”); see also Strauss, supra, at 1227–39 (describing the Court’s
retroactivity doctrine).
92. See infra note 108 (discussing the retroactive application of Atkins and Roper).
93. It may very well be the case that the logic of Graham has an even wider application than I
argue herein. For example, lawyers may prevail before the U.S. Supreme Court in arguing that
Graham also precludes a life-without-parole sentence for some juvenile homicide offenders. See EJI
Challenges Death-in-Prison Sentences for Young Teens in Two Cases at U.S. Supreme Court,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.eji.org/eji/node/524. In this sub-part, I am
focused on those inmates who are legally entitled to a resentencing hearing immediately as a result
of Graham, rather than future extensions of Graham.
94. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987); see also Davis v. United States, 564
U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (2011) (stating the rule from Griffith).
95. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322.
96. Id. at 323.
97. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
98. Id. at 310.
99. Id. at 311; Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 537 & n.22 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining the two
exceptions).
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of the State to proscribe” or prohibits a certain kind of punishment for a
certain kind of offender.100 Second, a defendant may argue for the new
rule to be retroactively applied if the new rule qualifies as a “watershed”
rule of criminal procedure and thus calls into question the “fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”101 More recently, the
Court has shifted its terminology somewhat102 and has described new
rules as “substantive” when they “alter[] the range of conduct or the
class of persons that the law punishes,” rather than describing them as
falling within the first of the two non-retroactivity exceptions.103
Generally, new substantive “rules apply retroactively because they
‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of
an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that
the law cannot impose upon him.”104
Applying this doctrine to Graham, it is evident that all juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving a life-without-parole sentence may challenge
that sentence under Graham. Because all new rules are applicable to
cases pending on direct review,105 those offenders whose cases are at the
direct review stage should not even need to address the retroactivity
question. Those inmates whose cases are on collateral review are also
entitled to challenge their sentence under Graham, as even the narrowest
reading of Graham renders a certain type of punishment—life without
parole—unconstitutional for a certain class of persons—non-homicide
juvenile offenders.106 Courts that have held otherwise have overlooked
the distinction between new substantive and procedural rules.107 New
substantive rules, like the one in Graham, are retroactively applicable
even to cases pending on collateral review.108
100. Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 271 n.5 (2002) (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494
(1990)).
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 n.4 (2004).
103. Id. at 353.
104. Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
105. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
106. In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (2011) (holding that Graham applies retroactively on
collateral review as matter of logical necessity).
107. See, e.g., supra note 90.
108. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, the U.S. Supreme Court barred a
certain type of punishment—the death penalty—for a certain class of offenders—the mentally
retarded. Id. at 321. Lower courts have recognized that this rule applies retroactively to cases
pending on collateral review, even though the U.S. Supreme Court did not expressly say so in
Atkins. See In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 2003). Instead, the rule applied
retroactively “by logical necessity.” Id. at 1172 (citation omitted). That is, the U.S. Supreme Court
had already identified what class of rules are retroactively applicable, namely those that are
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Even non-homicide juvenile offenders serving a life-without-parole
sentence who have already filed a federal habeas corpus petition should
be eligible to seek relief under Graham. The federal habeas corpus
statute bars second or successive petitions, but the statute itself does not
define what constitutes a successive petition.109 Federal courts have
determined that a habeas corpus petition is successive—and thus barred
except under very limited circumstances—“when it: (1) raises a claim
challenging the petitioner’s conviction or sentence that was or could
have been raised in an earlier petition; or (2) otherwise constitutes an
abuse of the writ.”110 Because Graham announced a new substantive rule
that renders a certain kind of sentence unconstitutional for an entire class
of defendants, the decision allows inmates to challenge their sentence in
a way they could not have in an earlier petition. Accordingly, because a
petition based on the Graham rule should not be barred as a “successive”
petition, the Graham rule may serve as the basis for relief even for those
inmates who have already filed a federal habeas corpus petition.111 Thus,
Graham applies to inmates nationwide who were sentenced to life
without parole for a juvenile non-homicide offense, regardless of the
procedural posture of those cases.
It is also worth noting that the application of Graham may reach even
further than the Court realized at the time of its decision. In particular,
the Graham Court relied heavily on one report—the Annino Report—to
calculate the number of inmates nationwide serving a life-without-parole
sentence for a juvenile non-homicide offense.112 The Annino Report
substantive in nature and preclude a kind of punishment for a class of offenders; the Court
announced such a rule in Atkins. Id.; see also In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding Atkins retroactively applicable). Courts also held Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),
in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred execution for juveniles, to
be retroactively applicable for similar reasons. See Holly v. State, No. 3:98CV53-D-A, 2006 WL
763133 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2006); Wimberly v. State, 934 So. 2d 411, 416 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
(“The Roper v. Simmons decision also applies retroactively to cases on collateral review because it
places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe.’” (quoting Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245, 251 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005)).
109. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006); see also In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.
1998) (noting that the statute does not define “successive”).
110. In re Cain, 137 F.3d at 235 (collecting cases on this point).
111. In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 260–62 (5th Cir. 2011) (granting inmate’s motion to file
successive habeas petition on the basis of Graham’s retroactive application); cf. In re Brown, 457
F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that successive petition is not barred based on the Court’s
new rule that it is unconstitutional to use the death penalty against the mentally retarded).
112. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010) (citing Paolo G. Annino et al.,
Juvenile Life Without Parole for Non-Homicide Offenses: Florida Compared to Nation, FLA. ST. U.
C.L. 2 (Sept. 14, 2009),
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estimated that there were 109 juvenile non-homicide offenders serving a
life-without-parole sentence nationwide, seventy-seven of whom were in
Florida.113 In order to arrive at this number, the Annino Report defined a
“non-homicide” crime as “any criminal conviction where the juvenile is
not convicted of any type or degree of homicide.”114 In other words,
according to the Annino Report, a defendant convicted of attempted
homicide or felony murder counted as a homicide offender.115
While the Court relied heavily upon the Annino Report to document
the incidence of juvenile life-without-parole sentences for non-homicide
offenders, it is not clear whether the Court accepted the report’s
definition of a non-homicide offense. The Court explained that
defendants like Terrance Graham are less culpable than others, in part,
because their crimes did not result in the death of another human
being.116 However, the same argument could apply to a defendant
convicted of attempted homicide, and yet the Annino Report treated
attempted homicide as a homicide offense. Moreover, citing felony
murder precedents, the Court stated that those “defendants who do not
kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken,” are less culpable
than murderers.117 This suggests that the Court may view a defendant
who was convicted of felony murder as a non-homicide offender, even
though the Annino Report did not. A Florida appellate court recently
applied a broader definition of non-homicide than that used in the
Annino Report and held that Graham applies to all cases where the
juvenile was convicted of a crime that did not result in the death of the
victim.118 The U.S. Supreme Court denied Florida’s petition for
certiorari challenging this interpretation on October 11, 2011.119
http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/annino/Report_juvenile_lwop_092009.pdf [hereinafter
Annino Report]).
113. Annino Report, supra note 112, at 2.
114. Id. at 3–4.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (“Serious nonhomicide crimes ‘may be devastating in their
harm . . . but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, . . . they
cannot be compared to murder in their severity and irrevocability.’” (omissions in original) (quoting
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 410 (2008)).
117. Id.
118. Manuel v. State, 48 So. 3d 94, 96–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Graham
applied to non-homicide offenders and that attempted murder with firearm was not a homicide
offense). But cf. Cox v. State, 2011 Ark. 96, 2011 WL 737307, at *2 (2011) (holding that Graham
permits imposition of life-without-parole sentence in case where defendant was convicted as
accomplice to homicide).
119. See Florida v. Manuel, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 446 (2011) (mem.), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/101111zor.pdf; see also U.S. Supreme Court
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In light of this analysis, it is simply not true that Graham was a
“narrow” case “which did nothing more than entitle a small group of
offenders to the mere possibility of eventual parole.”120 Rather, the
Graham decision applies retroactively to all juvenile offenders serving a
life-without-parole sentence whose crime did not result in the death of
the victim. The full extent of Graham’s application is still emerging as
lawyers working to implement Graham continue to identify inmates who
fall within its purview.121
B.

Graham Requires the States to Provide Effective Representation at
Resentencing Hearings

Having defined the pool of inmates to whom Graham applies
(“Graham inmates”), the next question becomes: what are these inmates
entitled to under Graham? Graham requires that the states provide each
Graham inmate with a resentencing hearing, as well as effective
representation in preparation for and at that resentencing hearing. The
resentencing hearing cannot be a pro forma protocol; rather, it must
afford the defendant and the defendant’s counsel the opportunity to
present the inmate’s full life picture—before and during incarceration.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.”122 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this right to
apply to “all critical stages of a criminal prosecution,”123 and sentencing

Upholds Decision Barring Life Without Parole for Kids Convicted of Attempted Murder, EQUAL
JUST. INITIATIVE (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.eji.org/eji/node/571.
120. Richard M. Re, Can Congress Overturn Graham v. Florida?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
367, 375 (2011).
121. For example, lawyers in Florida are also seeking the application of the Graham rule to
felony murder defendants, again, despite the fact that the Annino Report did not include felony
murder defendants. Telephone Interview with Ilona Vila, Dir., Juv. Life Without Parole Def. Res.
Ctr., Barry Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 4, 2011, 12:00 PM).
122. U.S CONST. amend. VI.
123. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009); see also Kansas v. Ventris,
556 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1844–45 (2009) (affirming that right to counsel extends to various
pretrial stages where defendant confronts agents of state); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170
(1985) (“[W]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him . . . . This is because, after the initiation of
adversary criminal proceedings, the government has committed itself to prosecute, and . . . the
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of
substantive and procedural criminal law.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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is a critical stage for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.124 Not only does
the defendant have a general interest in the “character”125 of the
sentencing proceeding, but also defense counsel can take several
measures throughout the sentencing process to safeguard the defendant’s
rights. Defense counsel may advise the defendant regarding the
government’s range of potentially applicable sentences and pre-sentence
investigations;126 inform the defendant of certain rights that may be lost
if not exercised at the sentencing stage;127 and present relevant
mitigating evidence.128 For these reasons, the right to counsel at
sentencing is almost as well-established as the right to counsel itself.129
When an existing sentence is modified or corrected, the defendant’s
presence, let alone defense counsel’s, may not be required.130 In contrast,
when “an original sentencing package is vacated in its entirety on appeal
and the case is remanded for resentencing,”131 the defendant has a
constitutional right to be present132 and to be represented by counsel.133
This distinction is appropriate. When a trial court merely corrects a
sentencing error and adjusts the sentence to make it less onerous for the
defendant, there is no evidentiary hearing; the sentencing judge’s task is
purely ministerial.134 Accordingly, neither the defendant nor defense
124. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 130–37
(1967).
125. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358.
126. United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[K]nowledge about the
structure and mechanics of the sentencing guidelines and the sentencing process will often be
crucial to advising a defendant about how to conduct himself through the sentencing process.”).
127. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135–36.
128. Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 749–50 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing counsel’s role in
developing and presenting mitigation evidence at sentencing).
129. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963) (holding the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applicable to state criminal proceedings), with Mempa, 389 U.S. at
134–37 (extending Gideon to the sentencing stage only four years later).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
defendant had no right to be present nor to have counsel when court’s action was “a remedial
reduction of sentence after a successful [statutory] challenge to the legality of the original
sentence”).
131. Id. at 1496.
132. United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654, 655–56 (5th Cir. 1991).
133. Hall v. Moore, 253 F.3d 624, 627–28 (11th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. United States, 619 F.2d
366, 369 (5th Cir. 1980); People v. McDermott, 906 N.Y.S.2d 415, 415–16 (2010) (remanding for
second resentencing because defendant was not adequately advised regarding his right to counsel at
resentencing). But see Morris v. Buss, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (noting that
while federal appellate courts have recognized the right to counsel at resentencing, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not explicitly extended the right to counsel at sentencing to include
resentencing).
134. Dougherty v. State, 785 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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counsel needs to be present in order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.135
In contrast, when a true resentencing takes place, the judge exercises
discretion, just as the initial sentencing judge did, and so the defendant’s
right to be present and to have counsel is constitutionally mandated.136
The Graham inmates are entitled to a resentencing hearing at which
the right to counsel attaches. Contrary to cases where the state court
judge will perform a purely ministerial task to the advantage of the
defendant, in the wake of Graham, state court judges presiding over
resentencing hearings will exercise great discretion.137 Precisely because
the Graham Court did not delineate the scope of a permissible term-ofyears sentence, defendants will need to argue for a specific sentence and
demonstrate why it is appropriate. In order to do so, the defendant will
need the assistance of counsel and perhaps other experts.138 Defense
counsel will need to present the defendant’s social history prior to the
initial sentence, behavioral record during incarceration, and prospects for
rehabilitation.139 This is especially true in light of the Graham Court’s
emphasis on the unique ability for juvenile rehabilitation and
maturation.140 After several years—if not decades—in prison, some of
these inmates may have demonstrated substantial growth and
maturity.141 The sentence they receive in a resentencing hearing should
135. See, e.g., United States v. Nolley, 27 F.3d 80, 81–82 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that where trial
court has no role but to implement corrected sentence from appellate court there is no function for
defendant or defense counsel); United States v. Brewer, No. 09-12945, 2010 WL 22847 (11th Cir.
Jan. 6, 2010) (affirming modification of sentence entered without defendant present).
136. United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 167–68 (1963).
137. State v. Casiano, 922 A.2d 1065, 1068–69 (Conn. 2007) (holding that state law entitles
indigent defendant to representation when seeking to correct sentence); Acosta v. State, 46 So. 3d
1179, 1180–81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding it was reversible error where trial judge exercised
discretion at resentencing and neither defendant nor counsel was present); State v. Littleton, 982 So.
2d 978, 980 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (distinguishing ministerial from discretionary act of judge).
138. Lawyers representing the Graham inmates at resentencing have said that they are treating
these resentencing hearings like capital mitigation hearings. Kinnally, supra note 5. If so, then they
will likely need to draw on the expertise of several outside consultants. See generally Am. Bar
Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 952–60 (2003) (describing the “team” approach and the necessity
of mental health and mitigation expertise for capital cases).
139. Kinnally, supra note 5.
140. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–30 (2010).
141. Scholars have debated whether and how prison sentence length and recidivism are
correlated. See, e.g., Lin Song & Roxanne Lieb, Recidivism: The Effect of Incarceration and Length
of Time Served, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y (Sept. 1993),
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/IncarcRecid.pdf (looking at studies showing both positive and
negative correlation). Recent work indicates that there is a positive correlation between sentence
length and recidivism. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Building Criminal Capital v. Specific
Deterrence: The Effect of Incarceration Length on Recidivism, NW. U. L. SCH. (Oct. 25, 2010),
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reflect that development and their potential for further rehabilitation.
Accordingly, the Graham inmates are entitled to a resentencing hearing
at which they are present and during which they have effective
representation.
C.

Judges Sentencing Juveniles After Graham Should Err in Favor of
Rehabilitation over Retribution

The Graham Court determined that the Eighth Amendment precludes
the states from imposing life-without-parole sentences on non-homicide
juvenile offenders, but the Court declined to set an upper limit on what
sentence such offenders could receive.142 Since the Graham decision,
lower court judges have grappled with that question and have come to
widely divergent conclusions.143 The Graham Court’s rationale
precludes excessive term-of-years sentences, for they, too, deprive the
juvenile offender of “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”144 Judges sentencing
juveniles after Graham should err on the side of rehabilitation over
retribution.
The Supremacy Clause requires state judges to defer to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal constitutional questions.145

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/law_economics/documents/AbramsRecidivism10251
0.pdf (finding a specific deterrent effect for sentencing, but one that diminishes as sentences get
longer); Valerie Wright, Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty v. Severity of
Punishment, SENT’G PROJECT 6–8 (Nov. 2010),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/Deterrence%20Briefing%20.pdf (discussing studies showing
positive correlation between sentence and recidivism rate). To the extent that prison conditions—
and the experience of them over longer periods of time—contribute to an increased recidivism rate,
I argue in Part II.D that juvenile conditions of confinement must affirmatively seek to promote
rehabilitation.
142. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects
the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”).
143. Compare People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 924–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding
that sentence of 110 years to life for juvenile non-homicide offender was not precluded by
Graham), petition for review granted, 250 P.3d 179, with People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870,
881–83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that eighty-four-year sentence for juvenile carjacker was
precluded by Graham because sentence that exceeds life expectancy is tantamount to life without
parole).
144. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
145. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
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Moreover, “[l]aw is not an exercise in mathematical logic,”146 and a
holding from the U.S. Supreme Court must be understood in its
appropriate context. Justice Kennedy’s opinion reflects an acceptance
that juveniles are both less morally culpable and more amenable to
rehabilitation than adults.147 According to the majority’s rationale, the
very nature of juveniles makes the life-without-parole sentence
impermissible outside the homicide context. Judges who impose
excessive term-of-years sentences in the wake of Graham engage in a
hollow and hyper-technical reading of the Court’s decision. Moreover,
judges who do so eviscerate one of the most central themes of the
opinion: hope and its importance for the incarcerated juvenile.148 Lower
court judges imposing sentences in the wake of Graham should heed the
Court’s language regarding the nature of juveniles and impose sentences
that enable possible rehabilitation and release.
The Court had at its disposal numerous arguments regarding the
unconstitutionality of Graham’s life-without-parole sentence,149 yet it
focused its opinion upon the finality and excessiveness of his
sentence.150 In an amicus brief, The Sentencing Project argued that
Graham’s life-without-parole sentence was unconstitutional because it
was imposed in the absence of jury or judicial discretion.151 The
Sentencing Project explained:
[J]uvenile offenders are frequently subject to mandatory transfer
and mandatory sentencing statutes, whose use has exploded
during the past two decades. The combined effect of these laws
often dooms juvenile offenders. At the outset, they require many
juveniles to be tried as adults. Then, upon conviction in the adult
system, they mandate life-without-parole sentences for certain
crimes. Together, these laws deny juveniles any opportunity to
have their age and diminished culpability considered by any
decision-maker at any stage of the proceedings against them.152
Despite the merit of this argument, Justice Kennedy’s opinion does
146. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 831 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
147. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30.
148. See generally Smith & Cohen, supra note 71.
149. Fourteen amicus briefs were filed with the Court in support of Petitioner Terrance Graham’s
Eighth Amendment challenge. See Graham v. Florida, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/graham-v-florida/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
150. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
151. See Brief for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14–22,
Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (Nos. 08-7412 & 08-7621).
152. Id. at 15–16.
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not indicate that the Court’s primary concern was a widespread lack of
sentencing discretion. If it were the Court’s main concern, one could
credibly argue that an excessive term-of-years sentence—even an 80- or
100-year sentence—in the wake of Graham was permissible, as long as
it was the product of independent judicial discretion. Instead, the
majority opinion focused on the unique characteristics of juvenile
offenders, relying on the same brain science that motivated its decision
to ban the death penalty for juveniles.153 In addition, Justice Kennedy
defended the Court’s categorical rule in part by asserting the dangers of
unchecked judicial discretion at the sentencing stage.154 For example, the
sentencing judge in Graham’s case imposed life without parole despite
significantly lower recommendations from the state, because the judge
“concluded that Graham was incorrigible.”155 When judges who hand
down excessive juvenile sentences argue, for example, that it is “cruel
and unusual punishment for the victims to have endured the rage, the
brutality, the terror that [the defendant] exacted upon them,”156 they act
precisely as Justice Kennedy feared: they allow the brutality of the crime
to overshadow the immaturity and potential for growth in the juvenile
defendant.157
Thus, Justice Kennedy’s opinion indicates that the constitutional
infirmity of Graham’s sentence was its finality and excessiveness in light
of his youth. The sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it
“guarantee[d] he [would] die in prison without any meaningful
opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to demonstrate
that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his
true character . . . .”158 Accordingly, lower courts sentencing juveniles in
the wake of Graham should avoid excessive sentences that foreclose the
possibility of parole review after a reasonable period of time.159
153. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27.
154. Id. at 2031 (“Nothing in Florida’s laws prevents its courts from sentencing a juvenile
nonhomicide offender to life without parole based on a subjective judgment that the defendant’s
crimes demonstrate an ‘irretrievably depraved character.’ This is inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment.” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
155. Id. (citation omitted).
156. Kunerth, ‘Lifers’ Sentenced as Teens Get 2nd Chance, supra note 8 (quoting Florida Circuit
Judge).
157. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031.
158. Id. at 2033.
159. If judges continue to impose sentences that are tantamount to life without parole, the U.S.
Supreme Court will most likely recognize an anemic reading of Graham as unconstitutional in due
course. For example, in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the Court considered the question
of whether a documented police technique of questioning a suspect first and then providing a
Miranda warning was permissible in light of the Court’s Miranda case law. Id at 604. The Court
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Finally, judges sentencing juveniles in the wake of Graham should err
in favor of potential release in order to promote finality and to protect
scarce judicial resources. In the handful of cases to date where judges
have imposed excessive sentences in the wake of Graham, defense
counsel has indicated, of course, that they will appeal the decisions.160
These appeals not only deprive the defendant and the victim of finality
regarding the sentencing decision, but also they are costly and timeconsuming for courts to review.161 Such time and cost cannot be justified
when a sentencing judge can impose an alternate sentence that both
serves the state’s penological goal and comports with Graham.
D.

Legislative and Executive Action Are Needed to Make Graham’s
Promise a Reality

In the long term, state lawmakers and executive actors need to take
bold steps in order for Graham’s promise to become a reality. Two
specific issues require immediate attention from legislators and
executive actors: (1) parole policy and (2) conditions of confinement for
juvenile offenders.
1.

Parole Policy

There is no federal constitutional provision that requires the states to
provide inmates with parole.162 In the early twentieth century, though,
most states recognized the need for corrections policy to address
rehabilitation and reentry into society.163 As a result, at that time, most
roundly rejected the protocol as a “police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings,”
and it held this “end run” around the Court’s Miranda decision unconstitutional. Id. at 616.
Similarly, if state court judges persist in imposing sentences in the wake of Graham as excessive as
70, 80, or 100 years, eventually the Court will recognize such sentences as an evisceration of its
decision in Graham and an end run around it analysis.
160. See, e.g., Kris Wernowsky, Teen Rapist Sentenced to 80 Years, PENSACOLA NEWS J. (Jan.
28, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review) (describing resentencing of Graham inmate and
counsel’s plan to appeal the eighty year resentencing).
161. It is difficult to identify precisely the costs of an appeal, but mainstream press accounts of
criminal cases demonstrate that, at every stage, our criminal justice system is expensive. See, e.g.,
Evelyn Larrubia & Stephanie Stassel, The Cost of Justice, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998, at B2,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/13/local/me-22481 (cataloging notorious criminal
trials in L.A. County, some of which cost ten million dollars or more); Trish Hartman, The High
Cost of Trials, WNEP (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.wnep.com/news/countybycounty/wnep-costtrial-lackawanna-schuylkill,0,7928109.story (describing trial that may cost taxpayers $100,000
exclusive of public defender expenses and additional courthouse security).
162. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right to
parole.” (citation omitted)).
163. The Future of Parole as a Key Partner in Assuring Public Safety, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE NAT’L
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states introduced the possibility of parole, typically at the discretion of a
parole board.164 In the late twentieth century, amid predictions of
increasing violent crime and “super-predators,”165 lawmakers and
academics grew skeptical of parole and perceived it as a threat to public
safety.166 By 2000, sixteen states abolished discretionary parole
altogether, while another five abolished discretionary parole for certain
violent crimes.167 This is not to say that today inmates do not leave
prison before the end of the sentence that is imposed upon them. Inmates
do leave prison before they have served their full sentences, but today
when they do so it is typically because they have served a statutorily set
percentage of their sentence—not because they have demonstrated to a
parole board that they are prepared to re-join society.168
In Florida, where Terrance Graham is serving his sentence, there is
almost no discretionary parole. Through a series of legislative changes in
the 1980s and 1990s,169 the state legislature created a system whereby
defendants must serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences
before they are parole-eligible, and no inmate serving a life sentence will
ever be parole-eligible.170 Because of the timing of the statutes, the
State’s Parole Commission still hears parole petitions for a small number
of inmates whose crimes were committed when discretionary parole was

INST. CORRECTIONS 1 (2011), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/024201.pdf [hereinafter The Future of
Parole].
164. Id. at 1–2.
165. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27,
1995, at 23; see also generally WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DILULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS,
BODY COUNT (1996) (advancing theory that new wave of young criminals would increase level of
violence by end of century).
166. See Jeff Bleich, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1147–48 (1989)
(describing states abolishing parole during this period); The Future of Parole, supra note 163, at 1–
2.
167. Timothy A. Huges et al., Trends in State Parole, 1990–2000, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (Oct.
2001), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tsp00.pdf.
168. For example, in Florida, inmates must serve eighty-five percent of their sentence before they
are eligible for release. See Misconceptions About Florida Prisons, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/myths.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (“Offenders who committed
their offenses on or after October 1, 1995, are required to serve a minimum of 85% of their courtimposed sentences prior to their release. Offenders released in January 2011 served an average of
86.4% of their sentence.”).
169. What is Parole?, FLA. PAROLE COMM’N, https://fpc.state.fl.us/Parole.htm (last visited Dec.
26, 2011) (describing evolution of parole in Florida and who is eligible); see also FLA. PAROLE
COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2009–2010, at 12–13 (2010) [hereinafter FLA. PAROLE COMM’N,
ANNUAL REPORT].
170. Doing Time, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS (Aug. 2011),
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/timeserv/doing/.
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still in place.171 For most purposes, though, there is no parole in
Florida.172
As a threshold matter, parole must be available under state law in
order to comport with Graham’s requirements.173 Immediate legislative
reform is needed in states such as Florida, where parole is largely
unavailable.174 What should such a statute look like? While juvenile
advocates have been largely reluctant to articulate a number of years
before which a juvenile should receive a parole hearing “out of fear that
such a suggested ceiling would immediately become a norm,”175 they
have made some suggestions. For example, some advocates have
suggested that all inmates serving a juvenile life-without-parole sentence
for a non-homicide crime receive a parole hearing when they turn thirty
or when they have served ten years in prison.176 Lawmakers and
lobbyists in Florida have suggested various models, allowing for parole
under limited circumstances after twenty or twenty-five years of
imprisonment.177 The optimal legislative solution is one that allows
maximum flexibility in recognition of the reality that each inmate will
present unique circumstances.178 For example, in 2009 Congressman
171. FLA. PAROLE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 169, at 20–22 (showing that only a
small percent of Commission’s work deals with parole services).
172. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010) (“Because Florida
has abolished its parole system . . . a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless
he is granted executive clemency.”).
173. As I described above in Part II.C, the Graham opinion requires states to provide Graham
inmates with at least the possibility of release during their lifetime. If current state law precludes
such a possibility, the law must be changed. See Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It
Is that You Threw Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham
v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
35, 67–74 (2010) (arguing that Graham requires states to have active parole boards in place).
174. See, e.g., supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
175. John Kelly, States Begin Reacting to Ban on Juvenile Life Without Parole, YOUTH TODAY
(Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.youthtoday.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=4469.
176. See John Kelly, Will Ruling Save All Lifers?, YOUTH TODAY (June 1, 2010),
http://www.youthtoday.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=4031 [hereinafter Kelly, Will Ruling Save
All Lifers?] (discussing parole proposals). Juvenile advocates in Florida make two important
arguments in favor of parole for Graham inmates after ten years or when they turn thirty. First,
advocates cite the fact that before parole was abolished for convicted murderers, such offenders
were eligible for parole after twenty-five years. The argument is that if adult homicide offenders
were once eligible for parole after twenty-five years, non-homicide juvenile offenders should be
eligible after a shorter period of time. Juvenile advocates also argue that the longer juveniles remain
in prison, the less likely they are to be able to re-join society. See Kunerth, Juvenile Lifers Wait 25
Years for Way Out, supra note 16.
177. Zayas, supra note 11. Twenty-five years was the numbers of years served before a homicide
convict could seek parole prior to the abolition of parole. Id.
178. See generally Jody Kent & Beth Colgan, A Just Alternative to Sentencing Youth to Life in
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Bobby Scott (D-Va.) proposed a bill that would require states housing
juvenile life-without-parole offenders to grant “a meaningful opportunity
for parole or other form of supervised release” at least once during their
first fifteen years of incarceration and at least once every three years
thereafter.179 One may argue that the initial period should be lower or
higher,180 but Congressman Scott’s proposal recognizes that there should
be an opportunity for review early in the juvenile’s sentence and that
review should be ongoing.
In the wake of Graham, state legislatures need to make parole reform
a top priority, and ideally resultant parole policy should include a
provision specific to juvenile offenders. While there has been much
debate regarding so-called “Graham Laws” in Florida and in other states
housing juvenile offenders like Terrance Graham, to date, no such
legislation has been passed.181
2.

States Should Facilitate Graham’s Promise Through Conditions of
Confinement

Making parole available under state law is only the first step required
of states that house Graham inmates. The Graham decision demands
that states provide juvenile non-homicide offenders a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release,”182 and a meaningful opportunity to
rehabilitate themselves prior to and in preparation for that parole
hearing.183 In order to do so, many—if not all—states that house
offenders like Graham need to critically examine and potentially
overhaul prison conditions for juvenile offenders.
In Graham, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]he juvenile should not be
deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-

Prison Without the Possibility of Parole, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 8 (Mar. 2010),
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kent%20Colgan%20Juvenile%20Life%20Issue%20Brief_0.pdf
(proposing “periodic review” of each inmate after at least ten years in prison).
179. Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 2289, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.2289:.
180. See, e.g., Kent & Colgan, supra note 178, at 8 (arguing for review possibly after ten years).
181. See, e.g., supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text (discussing lawmakers’ attempts to
enact legislation post-Graham); see also Paul Hammel, Lawmakers Reject Bill on Juvenile Lifers,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 8, 2011, at 1B (discussing failure of such bill in Omaha); Don
Thompson, Bills Target California Prisons’ Inspector General, CBS SACRAMENTO (May 1, 2011),
http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2011/05/01/bills-target-state-prisons-inspector-general/ (discussing
proposed legislation in California).
182. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
183. Id. at 2029–30; see also Wallace, supra note 173, at 75 (discussing rehabilitation).
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recognition of human worth and potential.”184 Without even the
possibility of future release, he further explained, a juvenile offender
may have no incentive to “become a responsible individual” or to
engage in the “considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse,
renewal, and rehabilitation.”185 Above and beyond the idea that the
possibility of release may incentivize individual reform, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion reflects an expectation that prisons actually enable
such reform. As he explained, “[i]n some prisons . . . the system itself
becomes complicit in the lack of development . . . [by] withhold[ing]
counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those who are
ineligible for parole consideration.”186 In light of the Court’s emphasis
on allowing juvenile offenders the opportunity to “achieve maturity”187
and to “reconcil[e] with society,”188 states must recognize that a parole
hearing—or even release after a parole hearing—does not address these
goals. Rather, these goals require substantive measures during
incarceration that would potentially allow a juvenile to rejoin society.
Juvenile offenders who are prosecuted as adults and incarcerated in
adult facilities currently have little opportunity for rehabilitation. First,
adult prisons rarely offer inmates the range of rehabilitative resources
required to treat inmates’ underlying conditions, such as substance abuse
and mental illness.189 Even when there are rehabilitative resources
available, priority is given to those inmates approaching the end of their
sentences, rather than to inmates serving life or life-without-parole
sentences.190 Second, adult prisons pose significant physical and mental
health risks to juvenile offenders.191 Many states that house juvenile
184. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2032–33; see also id. at 2029–30.
187. Id. at 2032.
188. Id.
189. Christopher Mallett, Death Is Not Different: The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult
Criminal Courts, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 523, 532 (2007) (“[A]dult prison systems offer few treatment
modalities to inmates.”).
190. Kunerth, ‘Lifers’ Sentenced as Teens Get 2nd Chance, supra note 8 (noting that those
serving life terms “go to the end of the line” to receive rehabilitative resources).
191. See generally Editorial, Raising Children Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A22;
Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of Incarcerating Youth in Adult Jails in America, CAMPAIGN FOR
YOUTH JUST. (2007),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf [hereinafter
Jailing Juveniles]; The Rest of Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the United
States, AMNESTY INT’L (2005),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/therestoftheirlives.pdf [hereinafter The Rest of
Their Lives].
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offenders in adult facilities have no regulations in place to protect or
separate juveniles from adult inmates.192 As a result, sexual and physical
assaults are a common experience for juvenile offenders in adult prisons.
A 2006 study reports that twenty-one percent of victims of substantiated
inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in jail were under the age of eighteen,
even though juvenile inmates constitute only one percent of inmates in
adult jails.193 Those who are not victims of sexual assault often feel
pressure to engage in physical violence and other coping mechanisms in
order to ward off sexual assault.194 Because the experience of adult
prison is so horrific for juvenile offenders, inmates under eighteen have
the highest suicide rate among all inmates.195 These deplorable
conditions of confinement are not amenable to the “considered reflection
which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”196
What conditions of confinement would facilitate the Graham Court’s
goals of rehabilitation and possible reentry into society?197 To begin,
developmental psychology and criminology research suggest that most
youth can be rehabilitated.198 Social science research indicates that the
crime rate peaks at age seventeen, and that most youth outgrow their
criminal tendencies.199 Moreover, most juvenile offenders have had
unhealthy, unstable, and abusive home environments, and they need to
experience a healthy environment of emotional expression, routine,
boundaries, and consequences.200 Ideally, “[h]ealthy social contexts”
192. Jailing Juveniles, supra note 191, at 24–37 (discussing dangers for youths in adult jails and
identifying policies state-by-state).
193. Id. at 13.
194. Id.; see also The Rest of their Lives, supra note 191, at 76–81.
195. See Jailing Juveniles, supra note 191, at 10 (noting juveniles in jail are also nineteen times
more likely to commit suicide than adults in the same general population).
196. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
197. Improving juvenile conditions of confinement is only one of many issues that demand
reform within the realm of juvenile justice. A full discussion of juveniles in the criminal justice
system is outside the scope of this paper. There is a wide body of literature on the topic. See, e.g.,
Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34
N. KY. L. REV. 189 (2007); Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The
Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2009); The Consequences Aren’t Minor: The Impact of Trying
Youth as Adults and Strategies for Reform, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. (2007),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_ConsequencesMinor.pdf; Jailing
Juveniles, supra note 191.
198. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime
Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 64 (2010) (noting that only five percent of youth are incipient career
criminals).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 65 (discussing the need for “[h]ealthy social contexts” and enabling the “process of
development toward psychosocial maturity”).
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entail positive authority figures, socialization with peers, and
participation in education, extracurricular, and employment activities
that facilitate “autonomous decision-making and critical-thinking
skills.”201
The State of Missouri created a juvenile justice system that has many
of these attributes and is now viewed as a national model.202 Juvenile
inmates are kept in small facilities, as close to their home as possible so
that they can maintain family connections.203 The staff members are
highly trained and experienced, and the model is based on respect and
dignity: “the system uses a rehabilitative and therapeutic model that
works towards teaching the young people to make positive, lasting
changes in their behavior.”204 The juvenile offenders are housed in dorm
rooms, rather than cell blocks, and their daily routine consists of school,
chores, and therapy—a routine that Missouri’s Division of Youth
Services Director says is “much tougher than . . . sitting in a cell.”205
While New York State’s youth prisons have an eighty-nine percent
recidivism rate for boys, “fewer than 8 percent of the youths in the
Missouri system return again after their release, and fewer than 8 percent
go on to adult prison.”206 Despite what some skeptics have said about the
ability to replicate this model, Missouri’s youth prisons serve juveniles
from racially diverse, urban areas; they contend with mental illness; and
even very serious offenders are treated with the same model of respect
and rehabilitation.207 Already, Louisiana, New Mexico, the District of
Columbia, and Santa Clara County, California, have begun to study and
replicate the Missouri youth prison model.208 In the wake of Graham,
other states should follow suit in order to create conditions of
201. See id.
202. See generally Douglas E. Abrams, Reforming Juvenile Delinquency Treatment to Enhance
Rehabilitation, Personal Accountability and Public Safety, 84 OR. L. REV. 1001, 1064–70 (2005)
(describing the Missouri model and its success); see also Charlyn Bohland, No Longer a Child:
Juvenile Incarceration in America, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 193, 221–24 (2011).
203. Bohland, supra note 202, at 223.
204. Marian Wright Edelman, Juvenile Justice Reform: Making the “Missouri Model” an
American Model, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2010, 9:50 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marian-wright-edelman/juvenile-justice-reform-m_b_498976.html.
205. Chris Cuomo et al., Missouri’s New Take on Juvenile Justice, ABCNEWS.COM (Sept. 8,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/missouris-juvenile-justice-system/story?id=8511600.
206. Edelman, supra note 204.
207. Id.
208. Richard A. Mendel, The Missouri Model: Reinventing the Practice of Rehabilitating
Youthful Offenders, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. 51–52 (2010),
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/Juvenile%20Detention%20Alternatives%20Initiative/
MOModel/MO_Fullreport_webfinal.pdf.
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confinement that will enable maturity, rehabilitation, and fitness to rejoin society.
In sum, as state judges and lawmakers struggle with the task of
implementing Graham on the ground, they should bear in mind the
logical consequences of the decision. Not only does Graham apply more
widely than one may initially assume, but also the decision requires both
short- and long-term implementation measures. Graham inmates should
receive effective representation at a resentencing hearing, and they
should receive a sentence that leaves open the possibility of release
rather than one that exacts the longest sentence technically permissible.
In the long run, states housing Graham inmates need to revisit and
potentially overhaul their parole policies and their conditions of
confinement for juvenile offenders.
III. GRAHAM GOING FORWARD
Part II addressed several urgent collateral issues that flow from the
Graham decision, and advocated for courts to implement Graham in
specific ways immediately. Over time, how courts deal with discrete
issues, like the ones raised in Part II, on a case-by-case basis may
improve or worsen the criminal justice system in the aggregate. This Part
addresses the relationship between Graham and the criminal justice
system on a national scale. Specifically, this Part suggests that: (1)
Graham ought to be viewed as a symptom of our national criminal
justice failings; and (2) Graham, read alongside the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2011 decision in Brown v. Plata, may signal the Court’s
increasing willingness to address criminal justice failings that it once left
to the states to resolve.
A.

Graham Reflects Broader Criminal Justice Failings

In order to generate meaningful reform in the long run, Graham needs
to be understood as a symptom of our nation’s ongoing criminal justice
failings. Specifically, it reflects an over-reliance on incarceration in the
United States and an entrenched indigent defense crisis.
To begin, our nation leads the world in its rate of incarceration.209
There are more than 9.8 million people incarcerated worldwide, and 2.29
million are in the United States.210 Florida—where most of the Graham
209. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, KING’S C. LONDON INT’L CENTRE FOR
PRISON STUD. 1 (8th ed. 2009) (citing incarceration rate of 756 per 100,000 in population),
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf.
210. Id.
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inmates are housed—“leads the nation in incarceration rates and
stringency in law and sentencing, making it the most punitive of the 50
states as measured by more than 40 variables, including average prison
sentences, life imprisonment, and prison conditions.”211 While Florida
may lead the nation in this regard, it is by no means an outlier in its
reliance on incarceration. California’s ongoing prison overcrowding has
garnered national media attention and an order from the U.S. Supreme
Court requiring a prison population reduction.212 Alabama, among the
top five states in the nation for its rate of incarceration, has seen its
prison population grow from 6000 in 1979 to 28,000 today.213 Between
2000 and 2004, Alabama increased its spending on prisons by almost
45% while increasing its school budget only 7.5% in that same period.214
We are a nation that relies far too heavily on the blunt instrument of
incarceration to address criminal justice failings that require holistic
reform.215
At the same time, our judicial system continues to tolerate ongoing,
systemic violations of the poor person’s right to counsel.216 Graham
again is a good example of this problem. More than eighty percent of

211. A Billion Dollars and Growing: Why Prison Bonding Is Tougher on Florida’s Taxpayers
than on Crime, COLLINS CENTER FOR PUB. POL’Y 5 (2011) (citation omitted),
http://www.collinscenter.org/resource/resmgr/prison_bonding/prisonbondingreport.pdf.
212. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the Brown v. Plata decision); see also Jack Dolan,
No New Taxes for Prisons, Residents Say, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at A1; Adam Liptak, Justices,
5-4, Tell California to Cut Prison Crowding, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at A1.
213. Excessive Sentences, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE,
http://www.eji.org/eji/prisons/excessivesentences (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
214. Id.
215. For example, mental illness and substance abuse are underlying issues for many inmates,
and incarceration alone cannot address these issues—in fact, it may exacerbate them. A recent
government report found that 56% of state prisoners and 45% of federal prisoners have a mental
health problem. See Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail
Inmates, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (Sept. 2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
Further, 74% of state prisoners who had a mental health problem also met the criteria for substance
abuse or dependence. Id. Yet, state prisons devote far too few resources to mental health care. Only
13% of state prisoners receive therapy or counseling; 10% receive psychotropic medication. Allen J.
Beck & Laura M. Maruschak, Special Report: Mental Health Treatment in State Prisons, 2000,
BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (July 2001), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf. Both the
states and the federal government should focus more on preventing crime through mental health and
substance abuse treatment rather than relying so heavily upon incarceration after the fact.
216. See generally ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken
Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice, AM. BAR ASS’N (2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclai
d_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf; Nat’l Right to Counsel
Comm., Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel,
CONST. PROJECT (Apr. 2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf.
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those who are prosecuted by the states are poor.217 Likewise, most of the
Graham inmates in Florida are poor and were represented by public
defenders.218 At every stage in the criminal process, people of color fare
worse than white people.219 Similarly, the profile of the Graham inmates
in Florida suggests that racial discrimination may have played a role in
the inmates’ convictions and sentences. The Juvenile Life Without
Parole Defense Resource Center has files for 96 of what they estimate to
be 115 Graham inmates in Florida.220 Of the ninety-six inmates for
whom they have files, ninety-two percent are black or Hispanic.221
While Graham is a significant case for juvenile justice advocates and
for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, these statistics suggest that
Graham is also an indictment of our nation’s indigent defense system.
Many of the juveniles who were sentenced to life in prison in Florida for
non-homicide crimes were mentally ill and enrolled in special education
classes.222 At least one of them was borderline mentally retarded.223 The
reason that these juveniles received these excessive sentences likely lies
as much in the quality of their representation as it does in a Florida
statute that authorized their sentence.224 In addition to shining a light on
217. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006).
218. I have begun to compile data regarding the Graham inmates in Florida, including the docket
sheets for these inmates. While the data set is still missing the dockets of a few inmates, among the
inmates whose cases I have reviewed, almost all had a public defender. Public defender caseloads
are notoriously high nationwide, usually resulting in sub-par representation. See, e.g., DONALD J.
FAROLE & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 1 (2007) (noting that seventy-three percent of county-based public
defender offices, including Florida, have caseloads that exceed the prevailing maximum). This is
consistent with the mainstream press reports that the Graham inmates in Florida did not have
adequate representation in the first place. See, e.g., Kelly, Will Ruling Save All Lifers?, supra note
176 (quoting Jody Kent, director of the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, as saying that
most of the inmates “did not have top-performing attorneys during the proceedings that landed them
in prison for life” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
219. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16 (1998) (“At every step of the criminal process, there is evidence that
African Americans are not treated as well as whites—both as victims of crime and as criminal
defendants.”); see also id. at 16 n.10 (collecting sources on racial discrimination in the criminal
justice system).
220. Juveniles: Who’s in Prison?, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 2, 2011),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/crime/os-life-without-parole-barry-box20110402,0,4643866.story.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. In a future work, I plan to examine these cases more closely and to search for patterns. How
many times did counsel meet with their client? What kind of investigation, if any, was conducted in
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the state of juvenile justice in this country, the Graham decision should
also augment the many voices who support broad, nationwide indigent
defense reform.225
B.

Graham and Plata: The U.S. Supreme Court May Be Willing to
Intervene in State Criminal Justice Matters that Are Egregious and
Long-Standing

As much as Graham reflects national criminal justice failings, the
opinion also offers some grounds for hope on that same front.
Specifically, when read alongside the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011
decision in Brown v. Plata, the Court appears increasingly willing to
assert federal constitutional limits in areas that had typically been
reserved for state judgment.
In Brown v. Plata, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question
whether a three-judge panel in California acted properly under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act in ordering California to reduce its prison
population in the face of ongoing, systemic Eighth Amendment

these cases? How many witnesses, if any, were put on to offer mitigation evidence at sentencing?
While this Article has focused on the immediate task of implementing Graham on the ground, the
question of whether Terrance Graham, and the other inmates like him, had effective representation
at trial still needs to be answered. For a general discussion of Florida’s ongoing right to counsel
issues, see Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers as a
Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 MO. L. REV. 885 (2010).
225. Scholars and various organizations have documented the nation’s persistent indigent defense
crisis. For recent reports discussing the crisis, see Backus & Marcus, supra note 217; ABA Standing
Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note 216; Robert C. Boruchowitz et al., Minor
Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, NAT’L ASS’N
CRIM. DEF. LAW. (Apr. 2009),
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf [hereinafter
Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste]; Nat’l Right to Counsel Comm., supra note 216.
In recent years, academics, practitioners, and politicians have proposed a number of creative and, in
some cases, radical measures to address the nation’s ongoing criminal justice failings, particularly
regarding access to counsel and sentencing. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to
Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 487 (2010) (arguing that Congress should enable systemic lawsuits in federal court that
challenge state public defense systems); Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the
Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791 (2009) (arguing that grounds for
federal habeas should be narrowed and resources saved should be dedicated to improving state
indigent defense systems); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007) (arguing that
appellate attorneys should be able to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal); Smart
Reform Is Possible: States Reducing Incarceration Rates and Costs While Protecting Communities,
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible_web.pdf (describing several state models for
reducing reliance on incarceration while saving taxpayers money and enhancing public safety).
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violations.226 The three-judge panel ordered the prison population
reduction after decades of litigation challenging a lack of adequate
mental health and medical services for California inmates.227 The
conditions at issue in California’s prisons were—and continue to be—
dire. Simply put, there are too many people in the prison system.
California currently houses almost twice the number of inmates for
which its facilities were designed.228 Because of this overcrowding, the
Court determined that the state simply could not provide sufficient
mental health and medical services.229 For example, “[b]ecause of a
shortage of treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be held for prolonged
periods in telephone-booth sized cages without toilets.”230 At the same
time, inmates with serious medical conditions endured similar waits and
conditions.231 The lower court heard testimony that, in one prison, up to
fifty sick inmates could be held together in a twelve-by-twenty-foot cage
for up to five hours awaiting treatment.232 Some prisons in California’s
system had a backlog of up to 700 prisoners waiting to see a doctor.233 In
light of this evidence and the case’s procedural history, the Court upheld
the prison reduction order in a five-to-four decision.234
As in Graham, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, joined by the
four liberal Justices on the Court.235 While the Plata opinion arguably
lacks Graham’s aspirational tone, and, in particular, its discussion of
hope, redemption, and self-reflection,236 the two opinions share several
important threads. First, both opinions stand for the proposition that, at
some point, state sovereignty and autonomy in criminal justice affairs
must yield to the protection of individual rights. In Graham, the Court
recognized that Florida is free to devise its own sentencing practices—
even if it stands practically alone in this country and in the world at large
226. 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922–23 (2011).
227. Id. at 1926–28 (citing the two consolidated actions in the case, one of which was filed in
1990 and one of which was filed in 2001).
228. Id. at 1923–24 (“California’s prisons are designed to house a population just under 80,000,
but at the time of the three-judge court’s decision the population was almost double that. The State’s
prisons had operated at around 200% of design capacity for at least 11 years.”).
229. Id. at 1923–26.
230. Id. at 1924.
231. Id. at 1925.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1933.
234. Id. at 1947.
235. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
236. See supra notes 184–188 and accompanying text.

06 - WLR March 2012 Drinan Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

GRAHAM ON THE GROUND

3/15/2012 12:08 PM

87

in doing so237—but those practices must comport with the
Constitution.238 In Plata, the Court again recognized that California is
free to make criminal justice decisions internally, such as incarcerating
technical parole violators and employing its three strikes laws,239 but it
must also comport with the Eighth Amendment in its conditions of
confinement.240 The opinions thus reflect a check on state autonomy.
Second, both opinions reflect an effort to protect the dignity of the
voiceless and politically powerless, something that elected officials and
elected judges are not always well-suited to do.241 In the last twenty to
thirty years, elected lawmakers have pursued tough-on-crime policies in
order to satisfy the electorate.242 Evidence suggests that elected judges—
like elected lawmakers—may do the same in order to earn voter
approval.243 Specifically, many judges hesitate to render a defendantfriendly decision, as elections sometimes hinge on the outcome of one
criminal case.244 In light of these realities, elected judges and lawmakers
237. In Graham, Justice Kennedy noted that Florida’s practice of sentencing non-homicide
juvenile offenders to life in prison without parole was an outlier within the United States, Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010) (noting that 77 out of 123 inmates nationwide
were serving the challenged sentence in Florida), and was rare worldwide, id. at 2033 (noting that
only eleven nations authorized the sentence and only two, including the United States, imposed it in
practice).
238. Id. at 2033.
239. Jack Dolan & Carol J. Williams, No Easy Fix for State Prison Crisis, L.A. TIMES, May 25,
2011, at A1 (noting that policy changes are required to stem the number of people entering
California’s prisons and citing parole violations and three-strikes as driving factors).
240. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011).
241. Elected officials in general reflect the sentiment of the majority. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135 (1980) (“No matter how open
the process, those with most of the votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the
expense of the others, or otherwise to refuse to take their interests into account.”).
242. Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 92 (2011)
(“Because there is no political benefit from appearing soft on crime and because there may be quite
a cost, politicians compete for the tough-on-crime label by continually ‘enacting ever more
numerous, more severe, and more expansive criminal laws.’” (citations omitted)); Michael A.
Simons, Sense and Sentencing: Our Imprisonment Epidemic, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 153, 157–58
(2010) (discussing recent increase in rate of incarceration and related “tough on crime” rhetoric).
243. See Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA.
L. REV. 719, 731–40 (2010) (discussing the evidence that suggests elected judges are, in fact,
influenced by majority preferences, especially in comparison to appointed judges); see also John
Schwartz, Effort Begun to Abolish the Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A12
(describing the lack of independence with elected judges). For a discussion of the problem of “judge
override” in combination with the dynamic of elected judges, see The Death Penalty in Alabama:
Judge Override, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE 13–14 (July 2011),
http://eji.org/eji/files/Override_Report.pdf.
244. Anthony Champagne, Judicial Selection from a Political Science Perspective, 64 ARK. L.
REV. 221, 236–37 (2011) (citing two studies that found “judges in politically competitive states
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may be reluctant to champion the cause of prison inmates. Yet, Justice
Kennedy’s opinions in both Graham and Plata articulate the unique
concerns of these groups in a way that would not resonate on the
campaign trail. In Graham, Justice Kennedy speaks of prisons’
complicity in juvenile inmates’ failure to rehabilitate and insists on
giving these inmates at least a chance to improve themselves.245
Similarly, in Plata, not only does Justice Kennedy’s opinion document
several representative stories of health care failures that caused serious
harm or death,246 but his opinion also includes photographs of
California’s dire prison reality.247 If nothing else, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in both cases shines a light on social problems that may
otherwise be eclipsed by majoritarian issues of the day.
Third, both opinions require systemic reform at the state level but
leave implementation of such reform to state discretion in the first
instance. The Graham opinion, for example, is virtually silent on issues
of implementation, as Justice Thomas noted in his dissent and as
discussed earlier in Part II.248 Similarly, Kennedy’s opinion in Plata
makes clear that California’s prison population must be reduced, but it
leaves the question of how that reduction will happen to state decisionmakers in the first instance.249 At the same time, the Plata Court’s
opinion also cautions the district court to “exercise its jurisdiction to

might be inclined to be sensitive to an electorate’s tough-on-crime views”); Amanda Frost,
Defending the Majoritarian Court, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 760 (2010) (“Empirical studies
demonstrate that elected judges issue longer sentences and are more likely to impose the death
penalty as elections approach, presumably because they fear being labeled ‘soft on crime’ by their
opponent in the next election. Their concerns are reasonable; judges have lost election because they
were perceived as too lenient on criminal defendants.” (citation omitted)).
245. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032–33 (2010).
246. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011) (“A psychiatric expert
reported observing an inmate who had been held in such a cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a
pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison officials explained they had ‘no
place to put him.’” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 1925 (“A prisoner with severe abdominal pain
died after a 5-week delay in referral to a specialist; a prisoner with ‘constant and extreme’ chest pain
died after an 8-hour delay in evaluation by a doctor; and a prisoner died of testicular cancer after a
‘failure of MDs to work up for cancer in a young man with 17 months of testicular pain.’” (citation
omitted)).
247. Id. at 1949–50 (images show severe overcrowding in makeshift “cells” and “dry
cages/holding cells for people waiting for mental health crisis bed”). For an interesting piece on the
question of whether the appended photographs help or hurt the majority’s position, see Dahlia
Lithwick, Show, Don’t Tell: Do Photographs of California’s Overcrowded Prisons Belong in a
Supreme Court Decision About Those Prisons?, SLATE (May 23, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/id/2295331.
248. See supra text accompanying note 4.
249. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1946–47.
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accord the State considerable latitude to find mechanisms and make
plans to correct the violations in a prompt and effective way consistent
with public safety.”250 Whether the balance struck in these decisions can
be implemented effectively remains to be seen.251
Finally, both the Graham and Plata decisions force states to
internalize more fully the costs of their crime and sentencing polices.
Graham, as argued in Part II, demands more than a parole hearing at
some point in an inmate’s life; rather, it requires the states to facilitate
self-reflection, maturity, and growth through conditions of
confinement.252 If applied strictly, that requirement is expensive, at least
in the short run.253 Accordingly, it may cause Florida state officials to
consider more closely the economics of transferring a juvenile to adult
court or sentencing a juvenile offender to a lengthy prison sentence.
Plata may have similar repercussions in California. If prison officials
must meet the medical and psychological needs of the system’s bloated
population in a timely manner, prison officials will need more staff,
more space, and more money to facilitate both.254 A legislature faced
with additional funding requests may reconsider the feasibility of
incarcerating so many people and explore alternatives to such mass
incarceration.255 In sum, both Plata and Graham impose requirements on
250. Id. at 1946.
251. For example, in order to comply with the Plata mandate, counties will now bear a much
larger burden for managing inmates and parolees than they have traditionally borne. Now, offenders
who commit non-violent, non-serious, and non-sexual offenses will be sent to county jails instead of
state prisons. George Skelton, Chronic Prison Underfunding Leads to More Local Burdens, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011, at A2, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/06/local/la-me-capprisons-20111006/2. Current state inmates serving time for these so-called “non-non-non” offenses,
will be supervised by county probation officials when they are released on parole. Editorial, Here
Come the Inmates, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at A12. There is great debate and concern over
whether the counties will have sufficient funding and experience to provide rehabilitation and
reentry resources for these inmates. Id.
252. See supra Part II.C–D.
253. For example, while it may cost more in the short term to provide inmates with education,
substance abuse treatment, counseling, parenting skills, and vocational training, these are the very
services critical to their successful reentry. See generally Edward E. Rhine & Anthony C.
Thompson, The Reentry Movement in Corrections: Resiliency, Fragility and Prospects, 47 CRIM. L.
BULL. 177 (2011) (describing the recent successes in the reentry movement along with its fragility
in part due to the fact that reentry goals are hard to measure in the short run).
254. To the extent that overcrowding and related understaffing led to Eighth Amendment
violations in Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926 (“[T]he prisons were ‘seriously and chronically understaffed,’
and had ‘no effective method for ensuring . . . the competence of their staff’ . . . The prisons had
failed to implement necessary suicide-prevention procedures, ‘due in large measure to the severe
understaffing.’” (citations omitted)), more resources will be needed to address these issues.
255. See generally Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste, supra note 225; Smart
Reform is Possible, supra note 225; see also Robert C. Boruchowitz, Diverting and Reclassifying
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states that may prompt legislative reform—reform that historically has
been hard to achieve.256
Thus, while the Graham decision reflects broader criminal justice
failings, when read alongside the Court’s recent Plata decision, it may
also indicate hope regarding criminal justice reform.
CONCLUSION
While many scholars have examined the long-term influence that the
Graham decision may have on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and on
sentencing practices,257 this Article addresses the immediate tasks of
implementing Graham on the ground. Specifically, it argues for courts
and legislatures to read the Graham opinion holistically and to embrace
its vision of hope and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders—even serious
offenders.
The future for inmates like Terrance Graham remains unclear. Since
September 2010, the Juvenile Life Without Parole Project at Barry
University has been working to identify inmates in Florida affected by
the Graham decision and to secure legal representation for those
inmates.258 To date, the Project has identified more than 100 inmates in
Florida who are entitled to a new sentence after Graham.259 All but a
few of those inmates currently have legal representation, and a handful
of inmates have obtained significant relief as a result of their
resentencing hearings.260
And yet there remains much work to be done. One inmate was
resentenced to a term of 170 years;261 another received a ninety-two-year
sentence.262 Legal appeals of these “virtual life sentences” are in the
Misdemeanors Could Save $1 Billion Per Year: Reducing the Need for and Cost of Appointed
Counsel, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Dec. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Boruchowitz__Misdemeanors.pdf.
256. The Plata Court noted that the two consolidated cases under its review had been in the
courts for decades, yet had failed to generate reform. 131 S. Ct. at 1926–27 (One case had been filed
in 1990, the other in 2001.).
257. See supra Part I.B.
258. Telephone Interview with Ilona Vila, supra note 121.
259. Id.
260. Id. Days before this Article went to press, Terrance Graham was resentenced to twenty-five
years in prison. Email from Bryan Gowdy, Terrance Graham’s Lawyer, Creed & Gowdy Appellate
Law Firm (Feb. 24, 2012, 5:55 PM) (on file with author).
261. Wiles, supra note 8.
262. Alexandra Zayas, No Life Term? Then 65 Years, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at
1B (stating the sixty-five-year sentence is to be served consecutively with a twenty-seven-year
sentence from another county). For a video of the sentencing judge in this case criticizing the U.S.
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works.263 While inmates await resentencing hearings, lawyers must
challenge their conditions of confinement. Several facilities in Florida
have no rehabilitative programs,264 and the Florida Department of
Corrections maintains the policy that inmates are ineligible for
rehabilitative programs until they are three years from their release
date.265 Accordingly, Graham inmates awaiting a resentencing hearing
cannot access rehabilitation services, yet they need those services in
order to demonstrate maturity and growth. Lawyers representing
Graham inmates must articulate this catch-22 to the courts and challenge
these policies.
There may be a silver lining to this painful process of implementing
the Graham decision in Florida. The Project has brought together public
defender offices, private counsel in Florida, and pro bono lawyers from
across the nation to represent Graham inmates in their resentencing
hearings. This kind of collaboration is a positive development.
Hopefully, as these lawyers pursue their clients’ legal claims they will
generate a wider conversation about juveniles in the criminal justice
system—a conversation that challenges the prosecution of children as
adults and exposes the juvenile experience of adult prison.
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